Trade openness can reduce inflation volatility through limiting recourse to seigniorage during periods of temporary fiscal deficits, and by shifting consumption and production towards goods for which the terms of trade are relatively stable. This paper provides evidence for a negative effect of openness on inflation volatility using a dynamic panel model that controls for the endogeneity of openness and the effects of both average inflation and the exchange rate regime. The relationship is found to be strongest amongst developing and emerging market economies. We show that openness reduces the volatility of reserve money growth and terms of trade growth and that these effects contribute to the relationship between openness and inflation volatility.
Introduction
A striking feature of recent global macroeconomic performance has been the substantial decline in in ‡ation volatility. In the United States in ‡ation volatility has fallen by two thirds since the mid-1980s and similar trends have been observed in other OECD countries (Blanchard and Simon 2001) . Even developing countries, which continue to experience higher and more volatile in ‡ation than the industrial countries, have seen in ‡ation volatility fall since the early 1990s.
The decline in in ‡ation volatility comes at a time of increasing international trade. This paper asks whether or not in ‡ation volatility is related to trade openness -can the greater in ‡ation stability of the 1990s be described, in the parlance of Rogo¤ (2003) , as a further 'unsung bene…t of globalization'?
We propose two mechanisms through which openness may restrict in ‡ation volatility. The …rst relates to the collection of seigniorage. If ‡uctuations in economic activity lead to regular changes in revenues from conventional sources of taxation governments may be forced to vary seigniorage to compensate, especially in developing countries in which there are limits to borrowing (Little et al. 1993) . The extent to which governments choose to resolve transitory de…cits through temporary changes in seigniorage, as opposed to changes in spending or other tax rates, will a¤ect the volatility of the growth rate of the money supply and hence the volatility of in ‡a-tion. The greater the welfare losses associated with in ‡ation volatility the stronger the incentive for governments to pursue means other than seigniorage to compensate for ‡uctuations in the tax base. In open economies in ‡ation volatility will be relatively costly if international trade induces stronger competition in markets supplied by domestic producers of tradables. This will increase the elasticity of the demand curve facing each …rm and a given amount of in ‡ation volatility will then translate into larger ‡uctuations in revenues, reducing welfare if …rms are averse to sales risk. In order to avoid this welfare loss the government can use measures other than the in ‡ation tax to deal with temporary reductions in revenues and this will reduce in ‡ation volatility.
The second mechanism relates to the set of markets in which countries participate. If the structure of consumption and production shifts towards high value added products in ‡ation volatility likely decreases because the terms of trade for such products are more stable (Bax-1 ter and Kouparitsas 2000). We argue that trade openness supports this transition. In terms of consumption trade contributes to the supply of high value added consumer goods, many of which are not produced in low income countries, whilst on the production side trade can support industrialisation through providing access to larger markets. To the extent that openness contributes to these forms of structural change the terms of trade will stabilise, and in ‡ation volatility will decrease.
Preliminary evidence suggests that trade integration is indeed associated with in ‡ation stability: Brahmbhatt and Dadush (1996) report that during the period 1984-93 in ‡ation volatility in countries that were slow to integrate was twice that in countries that achieved rapid integration. 1 Similarly, large reductions in in ‡ation volatility are often observed after the dates identi…ed by Wacziarg and Welch (2003) as marking the start of a liberal trade regime, e.g. the coe¢ cient of variation for in ‡ation during the …ve years before and after the liberalization date fell from 1:25 to 0:37 in the case of the Philippines and from 8:83 to 1:21 in the case of Cameroon (…gures are based on our calculations). More recently, Lo et al. (2005) provide crosscountry regression evidence demonstrating a negative correlation between openness and in ‡ation volatility. 2 However, existing studies have not tried to separate correlation and causation when examining the evidence linking openness and in ‡ation volatility, nor has the robustness of the relationship been investigated in any detail. This paper provides a …rst systematic account of the openness-in ‡ation volatility relationship.
Using panel data spanning 96 countries and four decades we demonstrate a robust negative e¤ect of openness on in ‡ation volatility. Our work departs from previous research in that we move beyond cross-sectional correlations and utilise temporal variation in the data. More importantly, we address the potential endogeneity of openness by using lagged values of openness and population size as instruments in estimating a dynamic panel model.
The evidence that we present parallels the negative relationship between openness and av-1 In ‡ation standard deviations for slow and fast integrators were 13.27% and 7.24% respectively. The "speed of integration index" is based on four indicators: the ratio of trade to GDP, the ratio of foreign direct investment to GDP, institutional investors'credit ratings and the share of manufactures in exports.
2 Two other studies, Bleaney and Fielding (2002) and Gruben and McLeod (2004) , provide brief evidence on this topic.
erage in ‡ation documented in Romer (1993) . 3 However, we show that openness has a negative and statistically signi…cant e¤ect on in ‡ation volatility even after controlling for mean in ‡ation.
We demonstrate the robustness of our …ndings to an unusually wide range of controls, including per capita income, country size, output volatility and the exchange rate regime. Furthermore, our results are not a¤ected by cross-country di¤erences in …nancial development, indebtedness, political constraints, the adoption of in ‡ation targeting and participation in IMF structural adjustment programmes. However, the relationship is shown to be stronger amongst developing and emerging market economies than amongst OECD countries.
In order to evaluate the proposed channels linking openness and in ‡ation volatility we augment our basic regressions with measures of the volatility of money supply growth (which captures the importance of the seigniorage channel) and terms of trade growth (which proxies the e¤ect of greater international price stability in markets for high value added products). This leads to a large reduction in the e¤ect of openness, such that it is insigni…cant at conventional levels. Auxiliary regressions are then presented to show that trade openness is a negative predictor of monetary and terms of trade volatility. These …ndings are consistent with the hypothesis that openness reduces in ‡ation volatility through …rst decreasing monetary and terms of trade volatility.
Understanding the determinants of in ‡ation volatility is important. The remits of many central banks stipulate not only a target for in ‡ation, but also the bands in which in ‡ation should ‡uctuate, suggesting that policy-makers care about the level of in ‡ation volatility. This may be due to a belief that in ‡ation volatility in ‡uences broader macroeconomic performance, for example Elder (2004) and Byrne and Davis (2004) provide evidence that volatile in ‡ation reduces investment and growth. In related work Buraschi and Jiltsov (2004) present a model in which in ‡ation volatility increases the risk premium in asset markets. Our results are also of interest because they complement research into other forms of macroeconomic volatility. Recent evidence on the relationship between openness and output volatility is ambiguous, suggesting either a positive or a negative link depending on the sample coverage and the set of controls;
3 The Romer evidence has been challenged, see for example Bleaney (1999) and Alfaro (2005) , but in a recent contribution Gruben and McLeod (2004) report that greater openness is associated with lower mean in ‡ation, especially during the 1990s. 3 see for example Easterly et al. (2001) and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) . The results presented in this paper indicate that the relationship between openness and in ‡ation volatility is more systematic, i.e. openness appears to exert a stronger e¤ect on nominal volatility than on real volatility.
The remainder of this paper expands on these points and is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses potential channels linking openness and in ‡ation volatility. Section 3 sets out the econometric approach and describes the data. Section 4 presents the empirical results and in Section 5 we interpret our …ndings in terms of the mechanisms discussed in Section 2. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
Openness and in ‡ation volatility
In this section we trace out possible channels linking openness and in ‡ation volatility. One view is that openness actually increases instability. For example, if trade is based around primary commodities, as has traditionally been the case in many developing countries, openness implies greater exposure to some of the most volatile international markets. Similarly, openness increases vulnerability to exchange rate ‡uctuations, although the importance of this will depend on the exchange rate regime. 4 On the other hand, there are several channels through which openness may reduce in ‡ation volatility. The …rst idea that we emphasise derives from a public …nance interpretation of the in ‡ation process. Consider a government that is solvent over the long-term but faces some variability in the revenues that it collects, e.g. due to business cycle ‡uctuations that a¤ect the tax base. If there are some constraints on government borrowing, as is often the case in developing countries (see Little et al. 1993) , periods of low revenues will require either …scal contractions (reductions in spending or increases in tax rates) or temporary recourse to seigniorage (the in ‡ation tax). The relevance of such a scenario is demonstrated by Aisen and Veiga (2005a) who …nd that during periods of negative GDP growth (and hence low tax revenues) 4 There is also a literature on the consequences of greater …nancial openness, which can raise exposure to procyclical capital ‡ows and therefore increase volatility (Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee 2004) . We address this possibility in the discussion of our results in section 4 and also in our special appendix for referees. 4 seigniorage requirements increase. 5 The argument that we advance is that in these situations reliance on seigniorage is negatively related to openness. This implies that when the tax base is temporarily diminished, episodes in which seigniorage is increased to generate income and then reduced once revenues from conventional taxation have recovered can be avoided. As a result the variability of the growth rate of the monetary base, and hence the growth rate of the aggregate money supply, will decrease. Assuming that in ‡ation partly depends on the rate of monetary expansion, in ‡ation volatility will be lower in open economies (the monetary view of in ‡ation has often been challenged but the empirical evidence indicates that it is relevant to developing countries, see Loungani and Swagel 2001) .
A key question is why should openness deter seigniorage during periods in which other tax revenues are temporarily low? The explanation that we focus upon is that the costs of in ‡ation and in ‡ation volatility may be larger in more open economies, as argued by Temple (2002) . For example, openness increases competition in markets supplied by domestic producers of tradables and this causes the demand curve facing each …rm to become more price elastic, see Chen et al. (2004) . A given amount of in ‡ation volatility will then translate into larger ‡uctuations in sales and revenues and, assuming …rms are averse to sales risk, in ‡ation volatility will induce greater welfare loss. 6 This may strengthen government commitment to stable in ‡ation and as a result governments will rely on spending cuts or increases in direct tax rates during periods of …scal stress, not seigniorage. 7 Aisen and Veiga (2005a) show that a de jure measure of openness taken from the Index 5 Catao and Terrones (2005) present a model in which …scal de…cits cause in ‡ation via the seigniorage channel and provide evidence consistent with the model. Click (1998) and Aisen and Veiga (2005b) provide empirical evidence on the determinants of seigniorage and in ‡ation respectively, and both studies are motivated from a public …nance perspective. 6 Razin (2005) develops a micro-founded model in which trade and …nancial openness increase society's aversion to unexpected in ‡ation. To the extent that more volatile in ‡ation implies greater variability in the unexpected component of in ‡ation, in ‡ation volatility will be more costly in open economies. 7 An alternative reason for openness deterring temporary recourse to seigniorage is that over time the revenues obtained from taxing tradables are less volatile than those obtained from taxing non-tradables, e.g. because the former can be monitored and taxed as they pass through ports and are therefore less likely to be diverted to the black economy in the aftermath of shocks.
5
of Economic Freedom (Gwartney and Lawson 2002) reduces the level of seigniorage. 8 The argument that we present extends this relationship so that openness decreases the variance of seigniorage (and hence in ‡ation) through creating incentives for credit constrained governments to pursue other ways of balancing budgets when revenues ‡uctuate, and in section 5 we present evidence consistent with this channel. Of course, in practice the means and variances of both seigniorage and in ‡ation are highly correlated. In our empirical work we therefore take care to test the hypothesis that openness decreases in ‡ation volatility after controlling for the important relationship between openness and mean in ‡ation documented in Romer (1993). 9 A second channel through which openness can a¤ect in ‡ation volatility is the structure of consumption. Increases in income levels likely induce a partial shift in consumer demand, away from low value added agricultural products and towards manufactured goods. The degree of substitution in consumption will depend on openness to trade because developing countries often lack capacity in the supply of certain consumer goods but can compensate by importing these goods in order to re-structure consumption in favour of high value added products. As terms of trade volatility for manufactured goods is one third less than aggregate terms of trade volatility (Baxter and Kouparitsas 2000) this change in the structure of consumption, achieved through the ‡exibility in supply provided by trade, will stabilise consumer price in ‡ation. Hence, countries that open up more rapidly, be it due to improved market access or governments reducing tari¤s and quotas, will experience larger reductions in in ‡ation volatility.
An example of this mechanism taking e¤ect occurred in South Africa following the removal of tari¤s and other trade barriers at the start of the 1990s, a process linked to political reforms that occurred at the time. This caused the share of exports plus imports in GDP to rise, from 45% during the period 1991 95 to 53:2% during the period 1996 2000. Furthermore, most of this increase in trade was concentrated in the manufacturing sector. Aron and Muellbauer (2000) develop an econometric model for the share of imported manufactures in total domestic 8 Similarly, Terra (1998) shows that average in ‡ation in Latin American countries following the debt crisis period is negatively related to openness, and explains this …nding in terms of debt repayment …nanced via seigniorage. 9 The link between openness and the level of in ‡ation has been challenged by Bleaney (1999) and Alfaro (2005) , while Gruben and McLeod (2004) argue that the original Romer (1993) (…gures are based on our calculation). Although this evidence does not demonstrate a causal link, it is consistent with the mechanism that we have described.
The link between openness and the structure of imports/consumption is related to the idea that trade serves as a risk-coping mechanism. In much of the developing world climatic shocks a¤ect in ‡ation volatility through their impact on food supply. Relatively open economies have been better able to reduce the sensitivity of food prices to climatic shocks by importing food during times of shortage, see Joshi and Little (1994) for an account of the Indian experience.
Openness may also restrict in ‡ation volatility via export structures. Export prices are not included in the consumer price index directly but may exert an indirect e¤ect via aggregate demand. In developing countries an export price boom, for example, typically increases government revenues, especially if major export industries are state owned, and these windfall gains are often used for wasteful public consumption that raises excess demand and in ‡ation for some period (Lal and Myint 1996; Collier et al. 1999) . A shift in exports from agriculture to manufacturing will stabilise the terms of trade because volatility is lower in high value added sectors. This is likely to reduce the volatility of government spending, which will in turn reduce in ‡ation volatility.
A key question, then, is whether or not openness is associated with structural change in production, towards manufacturing. Breinlich (2005) In related work Hausmann and Gavin (1996) Dollar (1992) as a barrier to industrialisation) the openness elasticity increases to 0:17 and the corresponding t-ratio is 1:81. 11 This suggests that openness Granger causes manufacturing growth and supports the view that openness reduces in ‡ation volatility by shifting production to sectors that are more stable.
The hypothesis that openness decreases in ‡ation volatility through shifting the consumption basket and the composition of exports towards high value added goods for which the terms of trade are more stable is closely related to the notion that the level of development in ‡uences volatility. Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) present a model in which countries with higher incomes are better able to undertake investment in indivisible forms of capital and therefore achieve a more balanced sectoral distribution of output. Empirical evidence presented by Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) is shown to support this prediction. Clearly, the level of development is also likely to play a role in reducing in ‡ation volatility, and therefore in our empirical analysis we control for per capita income in testing for a relationship between openness and in ‡ation volatility.
The above discussion has highlighted the ways in which openness may a¤ect in ‡ation volatility. Before describing the methods that we use in order to cast some light on these mechanisms, we close this section with a brief review of the empirical evidence on openness and other forms of macroeconomic volatility. Devereux and Lane (2003) show that bilateral nominal exchange rate volatility is negatively related to bilateral trade ‡ows and attribute this relationship to the standard optimal currency area hypothesis that exchange rate stability is more likely to be and in ‡ation volatility may be less strong amongst high income countries and we address this possibility in our empirical work. 
Data and methodology
In this section we describe the data and our econometric methodology. The in ‡ation data measure the annual rate of consumer price in ‡ation at the quarterly frequency and are taken from
International Financial Statistics (appendix B provides comprehensive notes on data sources).
We compile data for an unbalanced panel of 96 countries; the longest period for which data are available for any single country is 1961 : 1 to 2000 : 4. 12 It is important to note that as we have de…ned in ‡ation as growth in the price index over the last year rather than the last quarter there cannot be seasonal e¤ects in the data that induce spurious volatility.
In order to measure in ‡ation volatility we divide the data for each country into a maximum of 8 windows, each of 20 quarters (1961 : 1 to 1965 : 4, 1966 : 1 to 1970 : 4 and so on). 13 For each sub-period we then compute in ‡ation volatility (V IN F ) as
where sd is a standard deviation and IN F is the decimal in ‡ation rate (3% in ‡ation is 1 2 The 96 countries correspond to the sample used by Romer (1993) in analysing the relationship between openness and mean in ‡ation, except that we have excluded the four Gulf oil states considered by Romer, and included Chad, a country for which Romer was unable to obtain su¢ cient data. Appendix A lists the 96 countries included in the sample. 1 3 The full set of time observations are typically only available for OECD countries and the larger emerging market economies. As a result, the panel that we use is unbalanced. The maximum number of time observations per country is 8, the minimum 3 and (in the largest sample used) the average is 5:6.
represented as 0:03). A standard practice in the literature is to take log transforms to downweight very large readings that may occur during hyperin ‡ation episodes. One disadvantage of the log transform is that it overweights observations very close to zero (the log of such a reading is a large negative number). To avoid this, we consider the log of one plus the decimal standard deviation of in ‡ation. However, later sections in this paper show that our results are robust to alternative measures of V IN F .
In order for the standard deviation to be a valid measure of volatility the mean of the data must be constant over the period for which it is calculated and must not exhibit a secular trend.
By measuring volatility at the …ve-year frequency rather than over several decades we reduce the chances of identifying spurious volatility associated with shifts in mean in ‡ation. On the other hand, short window lengths risk confusing breaks in mean in ‡ation with persistent shocks around a stable mean. Therefore, in checking robustness, we consider window lengths of 3 years and 8 years. 14 The data for in ‡ation volatility include some outliers, even after the transformation in (1).
In order to ensure that our results are not driven by outliers we exclude observations more than three standard deviations from the mean of the unconditional distribution. This leads to 12
observations, approximately 1:5% of the sample, being dropped. These observations are mainly for Latin American countries that experienced extreme in ‡ation during the 1980s. 15 Openness is de…ned as the natural log of imports plus exports relative to GDP, and is denoted OP EN . 16 The log trade to GDP ratio is a frequently used proxy for openness and can arguably account for some of the core mechanisms linking openness and in ‡ation volatility emphasised 1 4 A further requirement for the standard deviation to be a valid measure of volatility is that the in ‡ation rate be an I(0) variable rather than an I(1) variable. The stationarity of the in ‡ation rate, at least within 5 year windows, is a maintained assumption in our analysis. Hendry (2001) argues strongly that the in ‡ation rate should be treated as an I(0) process rather than an I(1) process. 1 5 As a result of the outlier exclusion procedure Brazil and Nicaragua drop out of the sample because the estimation technique that we employ requires that three consecutive observations be available in order for a country to be included in the panel. Although these countries represent interesting examples of successful reductions in in ‡ation volatility, our sample still includes many Latin American countries whose experiences have been similar.
We argue that our …ndings concerning openness and in ‡ation volatility are applicable to the Latin American experience. 1 6 We checked OP EN for outliers using the criterion applied to V IN F , but none were found.
in our earlier discussion. 17 However, being a de facto measure of openness, it is potentially endogenous, warranting the use of instrumental variables in the estimation procedure. -the secular decline in in ‡ation volatility observed in developed countries is absent. The average trade to GDP ratio has exhibited a steady increase since the early 1970s, though the experiences of individual groups of countries do vary.
In Figure 1 we plot V IN F against OP EN . Even before controlling for country …xed e¤ects, time dummies, other regressors and potential reverse causation a negative relationship between openness and in ‡ation volatility can be observed. Each graph reveals some extreme observations, even after the steps taken to deal with outliers. However, in the robustness section we show that our main results do not depend on these observations.
The econometric model
In order to estimate the e¤ect of openness on in ‡ation volatility we consider the following model:
where i denotes a country, t a 5 year period, i a country …xed e¤ect and " it the error term.
The lagged dependent variable in (2) controls for persistence in in ‡ation volatility, which may be intrinsic or simply a proxy for other determinants of volatility that are omitted at this stage.
The approach to estimating (2) follows Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995) . In order to eliminate the time invariant …xed e¤ects we take …rst di¤erences of (2) to obtain
Estimating (3) by least squares is problematic. Firstly, the transformed error term is correlated with the lagged dependent variable (both include " it 1 ) and this will lead to biased parameter estimates. Secondly, OP EN may be endogenously determined, e.g. if volatile in ‡a-tion is an impediment to trade then causation will run from left to right in (3) and the impact of openness on in ‡ation volatility will be overstated. Alternatively, there may exist a common cause for openness and in ‡ation volatility. One possibility is that each is the result of deeper preferences that shape macroeconomic policy, whilst another is that shocks to the terms of trade a¤ect both variables, e.g. a collapse in export prices may reduce the nominal value of exports such that OP EN it falls and at the same time cause aggregate demand to change so that in ‡ation volatility increases.
In order to address these problems Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest a generalised method of moments (GMM) technique. Assuming that the errors in equation (2) and OP EN dated t 2 and earlier are valid instruments with which to identify the exogenous variation in openness. 19 A potential drawback of this Di¤ erenced-GMM estimator is that in the presence of high time-series persistence and short panels, lagged levels of the variables may be poor instruments for subsequent …rst di¤erences, leading to …nite sample biases (Blundell and Bond 1998 ). An alternative approach, suggested by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) , is the System-GMM estimator, which uses lagged di¤erences of each variable as instruments in estimating the levels relationship in (2), and combines this information with the Di¤ erenced-GMM estimates of equation (3). The validity of these instruments requires a constant correlation between V IN F it and the …xed e¤ect, and between OP EN it and the …xed e¤ect. If this is the case, V IN F it 1 and OP EN it 1 are orthogonal to future realisations of the error terms and represent valid instruments for estimating the parameters of (2). 20
In implementing the System-GMM estimator we utilise external instruments based on lagged values of log population size, P OP . This term is the time-varying element of a standard gravity model of trade ‡ows; see for example Frankel and Romer (1999) . Although gravity equations typically use population size to explain cross-sectional di¤erences in openness, we …nd that past population size helps to predict the evolution of openness and can therefore be used to increase the e¢ ciency of the GMM estimator. The role of the external instrument is further examined in the discussion of the empirical results in Section 4.
The validity of the instruments can be evaluated using the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions and Lagrange Multiplier tests for the absence of second order serial correlation (Arellano and Bond 1991) . It is important to note that the …rst di¤erenced transformation yielding (3) induces an MA(1) error structure, and therefore we expect that the …rst-di¤erenced residuals will be negatively autocorrelated at the …rst lag but uncorrelated at the second lag.
The estimated standard errors take account of the …rst-order negative autocorrelation and any heteroscedasticity in the residuals, see Arellano and Bond (1991) . As recommended by Blundell and Bond (1998) the estimates that we report are based on 1-step GMM estimation in which equal weight is placed on each moment condition. 21
Empirical results
In Table 2 we present our basic empirical results. Columns 1 4 list the ordinary least squares (OLS), within groups (WG), Di¤ erenced-GMM and System-GMM estimates of a model in which in ‡ation volatility depends on its own lag and openness, plus a full set of time dummies. The
Di¤ erenced-GMM estimates use as instruments V IN F t 2 , OP EN t 2 , P OP t 2 and P OP t 3 and the System-GMM estimates use as additional instruments OP EN t 1 and P OP t 2 . 22 In each 2 0 Speci…cally, the following additional moment conditions are available: E( V IN Fit s( i + "it)) = 0 for s = 1
and E( OP ENit s( i + "it)) = 0 for s = 1. 2 1 All estimations are conducted using the DPD package in Pc-Give, see Doornik and Hendry (2001) . 2 2 The di¤erenced lagged dependent variable is not used as an instrument in the levels part of the system estimator because the marginal restrictions required in order for it to be a valid instrument were rejected by a Sargan test. It appears that there has been some 'in ‡ation volatility convergence' during the sample period -case the e¤ect of openness on in ‡ation volatility is negative and this relationship is propagated through time by the positively signed autoregressive term.
The model that we emphasise is the System-GMM estimate in column 4 which shows that (OP EN ) and 34% (P OP ), suggesting that each type of instrument is individually valid. Furthermore, the AR(1) and AR(2) tests provide strong support for the hypothesis that the errors in (2) are serially uncorrelated, a necessary condition for instrument validity.
A related question concerns the explanatory power of the instruments. If the instruments are weak the exogenous variation in openness will be limited and this may distort inference (Stock, Wright and Yogo 2002 14 re ‡ects a problem of weak instruments. The centrality of the Di¤ erenced-GMM and System-GMM estimates with respect to the OLS-WG range is further evidence that our results are not due to weak instruments.
In the …nal two columns of Table 2 we take a further look at the role of the external instrument, P OP . In column 5 all terms in P OP are dropped from the instrument set. A comparison of these results with those in column 4 indicates that the main role of P OP is to increase the e¢ ciency of the estimation. This is seen most clearly in the case of the openness e¤ect, which is actually of greater magnitude in column 5 than in column 4 but yields a smaller t-ratio because its standard error increases three-fold. Hence, the external instrument does not induce the sign or magnitude of OP EN but instead increases the precision of the estimation. In column 6 we address the possibility that the signi…cance of OP EN is due to P OP having been excluded from the regressors. The results indicate that this is not the case. Instead, changes in population size matter for in ‡ation volatility only through inducing a change in openness, i.e. P OP satis…es the standard requirements of an instrumental variable.
Robustness: Adding further controls
In this sub-section we add further controls to the basic model. The largest sample for which all of the regressors are available comprises 451 observations drawn from 84 countries and this is the sample that we use in each column of Table 3 (the 12 countries that drop out of the 96 country sample used in Table 2 are listed in appendix A). In order to conserve space we focus on the System-GMM estimates.
The …rst column reproduces the simple speci…cation for the new sample size. The magnitude of each coe¢ cient falls slightly but the qualitative results are robust. Column 2 controls for the natural log of one plus mean in ‡ation (IN F ) and uses as instruments IN F t 3 and IN F t 2 (instruments at shorter lags are invalid according to a D-Sargan test). Mean in ‡ation is highly signi…cant, re ‡ecting its strong correlation with in ‡ation volatility. The openness coe¢ cient falls to :044, a little more than half its value in column 4 of Table 2 , but owing to greater precision in the estimation it remains signi…cant at the 5% level, i.e. openness reduces in ‡ation volatility even amongst countries that have the same average in ‡ation. The autoregressive parameter is close to zero after controlling for mean in ‡ation. Indeed, deleting the autoregressive term from column 2 leaves the results practically unchanged -the openness coe¢ cient remains :044 and the t-ratio is 2:26 (static estimates of regressions 3 10 are reported in Table A2 in the special appendix for referees). 25 We experimented with two variations on the column 2 speci…cation. Firstly, given the important relationship between mean in ‡ation and in ‡ation volatility, we de…ned the regression in terms of the log coe¢ cient of variation for in ‡ation (the standard deviation of in ‡ation relative to mean in ‡ation). A GMM-SYS regression of this term on its …rst lag plus openness yields an openness e¤ect that is signi…cant at the 5% level. Secondly, we experimented with a non-linear relationship between the …rst two moments of in ‡ation: Adding the square of mean in ‡ation to column 2 gives an openness coe¢ cient of :041 and a corresponding t-ratio of 2:11 (full details of these two experiments are available on request).
In column 3 we control for the natural log of GDP per capita (RGDP ) and add the second lag of that variable to the instruments. 26 This is measured in 1996 US$ and corresponds to the …rst year from each of the 5 year windows for which in ‡ation volatility is measured. The e¤ect of RGDP is negative but close to zero. Further (unreported) experimentation shows that this is due to IN F having been included in the regression (the e¤ect of RGDP is entirely mediated through mean in ‡ation). The openness coe¢ cient is further diminished relative to column 1 but is signi…cant at the 6% level. Column 4 controls for the log product of population and per capita income, a measure of economic size. This is a potentially important control when analysing the e¤ects of openness, see Lane (1997) , but does not change the picture in this case.
We next address the possibility that openness exerts di¤erent e¤ects on primary commodity exporters. In section 2 we noted that greater openness may increase volatility, or reduce it by less, if openness implies expansion in markets for primary commodities, which are relatively volatile. The dummy P RIM EXP is equal to unity for countries for which more than 50% of 2 5 It should be noted that although originally proposed for dynamic panel models, the System-GMM technique is an e¢ cient estimator for static panels and has often been used in this context, see Beck (2002) . 2 6 Unless otherwise stated, regressions 3 9 use the second lag of the marginal variable as an additional instrument. Instruments based on lagged …rst di¤erences of the marginal terms are not used because we found that in some speci…cations the Sargan p-value was close to unity, which is a sign that the instrument set is too large and that estimation may be imprecise.
exports during the period 1988 92 are fuels or other primary commodities, and zero otherwise.
In column 5 the negative impact of openness on in ‡ation volatility is smaller amongst primary commodity exporters, but the interaction term is insigni…cant and the main conclusion is that the overall e¤ect of openness is negative amongst both groups of countries. 27
In section 2 we also noted that openness may increase in ‡ation volatility if it is associated with increased …nancial ‡ows, which are often pro-cyclical and can amplify volatility. Measures of …nancial openness such as foreign direct investment relative to GDP turn out insigni…cant, whereas trade openness becomes more negative and is signi…cant at the 1% level, indicating that …nancial variables may control for one mechanism through which openness increases volatility (results are presented in a special appendix for referees).
The next idea that we explore is that movements in in ‡ation volatility result from changes in the size of economic shocks. This is the 'good luck'hypothesis in the literature on volatility in the United States, see Ahmed, Levin and Wilson (2002) . We control for the natural log of one plus the decimal standard deviation of annual output growth (V OL). If smaller supply and demand shocks drive output and in ‡ation volatility, and the link between openness and in ‡ation volatility is coincidental, the augmented regression should reveal this fact. In column 6 openness remains signi…cant at the 5% level while output volatility is insigni…cant.
The weak e¤ect of output volatility could be due to supply shocks that reduce output growth and raise in ‡ation. In the aftermath of such shocks a policy authority can trade-o¤ higher output volatility for lower in ‡ation volatility, or vice versa, through shifting aggregate demand. This may weaken the positive association between output and in ‡ation variance. In column 7 we control for the natural log of one plus the decimal standard deviation of the trade weighted mean of output growth in the …ve largest trading partners of each country (T P V OL), which is generally beyond the control of the domestic policy authority. The e¤ect of T P V OL is stronger than that of V OL (the large point estimate is due to the very small standard deviation of T P V OL). We also estimated (but do not report) a model interacting T P V OL with OP EN , to allow in ‡ation volatility to be more responsive to foreign GDP volatility in more open economies.
This term generated a coe¢ cient of 0:555 (t = 2:03), while the coe¢ cient for OP EN was :050 (t = 2:43). The mean of T P V OL is :02, which implies that the total marginal e¤ect of OP EN is negative, even though it appears that sensitivity to global shocks is one channel through which openness can increase in ‡ation volatility.
In column 8 we control for the natural log of one plus the black market exchange rate premium (BM P ), de…ned as the percentage markup of the black market exchange rate over the o¢ cial rate. This is regarded as a measure of market distortions, and the policies that induce these distortions may also be a source of in ‡ation volatility. More speci…cally, controlling for BM P may shed some light on an alternative interpretation of our results, which is that they are a by-product of policy reforms implemented in return for assistance from bodies such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Such reforms often require that countries remove trade barriers and adopt more disciplined …scal and monetary policy, which will reduce in ‡ation volatility. The black market premium is regarded as a measure of the intensity of market distortions and is therefore likely to be inversely related to success in implementing reforms.
The fact that OP EN remains signi…cant when controlling for BM P suggests that the negative relationship between openness and in ‡ation volatility is not simply a by-product of pro-market reforms. 28 In column 9 we control for the natural log of one plus the average rate of economic growth (GROW T H), the rationale being that during 'good times'in ‡ation volatility may be more easy to control. The results indicate some evidence for this and the openness e¤ect is diminished and is signi…cant at only the 10% level. However, in the next column we pool all of the controls used in Table 3 and …nd that OP EN is signi…cant at the 5% level.
Additional robustness checks are reported in the special appendix. We consider alternative de…nitions of in ‡ation volatility and openness and numerous controls, including …nancial depth, an index of political constraints, government size and climatic volatility. The negative e¤ect of openness is robust in each case.
2 8 The insigni…cance of BM P is surprising, but turns out to be a consequence of controlling for mean in ‡ation.
If mean in ‡ation is removed from column 8 the t-ratio for BM P rises to 1:97.
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The role of the exchange rate regime
A …xed exchange rate combined with capital mobility is thought to restrict discretionary monetary policy by forcing a country to adopt foreign monetary policy. This may reduce in ‡ation volatility. Alfaro (2005) …nds that the exchange rate regime (not openness) explains average in ‡ation performance. On the other hand Tornell and Velasco (2000) show that …xed rates can induce …scal laxity, and this may increase volatility. Bleaney and Fielding (2002) present a model in which tighter exchange rate pegs reduce in ‡ation volatility except in the case of the multi-lateral pegs maintained by the Francophone countries in Africa, which increase volatility because the peg prevents monetary authorities from o¤setting the e¤ects of external shocks.
We consider the de facto exchange rate regime classi…cation proposed by Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2004) . This provides an index in the range 1 4 where 4 denotes greatest exchange rate ‡exibility. 29 In contrast to the o¢ cial IMF classi…cation the Reinhart-Rogo¤ scheme is based on actual exchange rate movements rather than the policy a central bank claims to have followed.
Furthermore, the Reinhart-Rogo¤ scheme incorporates information on black market currency exchange in addition to o¢ cial purchases. 30 In column 1 of Table 4 we add the exchange rate regime indicator (XRAT E) to our baseline regression and in column 2 we add the square of the exchange rate regime in order to test for non-linearities of the sort discussed by Bleaney and Fielding (2002) . The additional control does not alter the role of openness and is statistically insigni…cant. Adding mean in ‡ation to the column 1 speci…cation induces a negative sign for XRAT E that is signi…cant at the 10% level. This may occur because the e¤ect of a …xed exchange rate in restricting discretionary policy is re ‡ected in mean in ‡ation, such that after controlling for IN F the partial e¤ect of XRAT E captures only the increases in volatility that occur if …xed rates restrict stabilisation 2 9 A …fth category is also available but this refers to countries with 'freely falling' rates. One criterion for identifying such cases is an in ‡ation rate above 40%, i.e. a large positive in ‡ation shock automatically places a country in the top tier and therefore this category will be highly endogenous. Consequently we focus on categories 1 4. 3 0 In an important study, Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) propose an alternative de facto classi…cation of the exchange rate regime that utilises information on currency reserves in addition to the nominal exchange rate.
However, this index is available for fewer countries than the Reinhart-Rogo¤ classi…cation.
policies.
A potential problem with these results is that the instruments for XRAT E may be ine¤ective given that it is a discrete variable. In column 4 we use the XRAT E information in a di¤erent way. We restrict the sample to those observations for which XRAT E is de…ned as a peg or a peg with bands that stretch 2% either side of the target. The openness term retains its signi…cance in this sample of …xed and semi-…xed exchange rates. This …nding provides some evidence against the hypothesis that our results arise only because increased openness happens to have been associated with a reduction in in ‡ation volatility arising from reduced pass-through from exchange rates to consumer prices. As changes in pass-through are unlikely to have been an important driver of in ‡ation volatility in cases in which exchange rate ‡uctuations have been minimal the relationship between openness and in ‡ation volatility is hard to interpret as the result of failure to control for changes in pass-through.
In columns 5 8 we side-step the issue of how to instrument the exchange rate regime by reporting within groups estimates. The results in column 5 indicate a much stronger positive e¤ect of the exchange rate regime in this case (compare the results with those in column 1).
However, this relationship disappears on controlling for mean in ‡ation. In columns 7 and 8 the evidence for a U-shaped e¤ect of XRAT E remains weak. In contrast, the e¤ect of openness on in ‡ation volatility is quite robust in all cases. Table 6 presents results for various sub-samples. In column 1 we exclude the 5% most extreme values for in ‡ation volatility and openness (2:5% from each tail of each unconditional distribution). This means that Hong Kong and Singapore are omitted from the sample, an important robustness check given that trade ratios may overstate the openness of these countries because many imports are almost immediately exported. The e¤ect of openness is robust.
Robustness across sub-samples
In column 2 we exclude the 38 countries that are not awarded at least a grade C for data quality by Summers and Heston (1988) . Openness is signi…cant at the 5% level, suggesting that our basic …ndings are not due to low data quality in closed economies inducing spurious volatility.
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The next sub-sample comprises the 68 low debt countries listed in Terra (1998) . Terra argues that the negative relationship between the levels of openness and in ‡ation exists only amongst heavily indebted countries; here we investigate whether the same is true of openness and in ‡ation volatility. Openness is signi…cant at the 5% level and its coe¢ cient is of similar magnitude to those obtained in Table 3 .
In column 4 we omit the 20 countries that maintained an in ‡ation targeting regime during some part of the sample (dates are taken from Fatas, Mihov and Rose 2004) . 31 The openness e¤ect is robust, suggesting that our main results are not due to in ‡ation targeting schemes having caused a reduction in in ‡ation volatility and such changes being correlated with openness by chance.
The next hypothesis that we address is that our results arise because structural adjustment programmes associated with IMF/World Bank loans secure both macroeconomic stability and trade openness. In column 5 we exclude 18 countries identi…ed by Easterly (2005) Column 6 focuses on 71 developing and emerging market economies. 32 The e¤ect of openness is larger and more signi…cant in the developing country sample than in the full sample. The opposite is true in column 7, which looks only at the 23 OECD countries excluded from the column 6 sample ( RGDP t 1 is added to the instruments used in column 7 because initial results indicated very imprecise estimation). These results may arise because there exist reasons to pursue in ‡ation stability in OECD countries even in the absence of openness, e.g. Posen (1993) emphasises the importance of …nancial sector opposition to in ‡ation in industrial countries.
Similarly, consumption and production in OECD countries may have been concentrated in high value added sectors at the start of the sample, in which case greater trade openness may be less 3 1 Two countries, South Africa and Thailand, adopted in ‡ation targeting during 2000, the …nal year of the sample. As a reform occurring in this year is unlikely to a¤ect our results we do not exclude these countries. 3 2 These are the 96 countries in the core sample minus 23 countries that have been OECD members since 1961.
Turkey has been an OECD member since 1961, but we include Turkey in the 71 country sub-sample on the grounds that it is best regarded as an emerging market economy. Hong Kong and Singapore are excluded even though they are not OECD members (including these two countries does not change the results).
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likely to reduce in ‡ation volatility by promoting structural change in this direction.
Robustness to varying the data frequency
In Table 6 we consider the sensitivity of our results to changing the data frequency. Column 1 uses a measure of in ‡ation volatility based on 5 year windows but calculated from annual rather than quarterly data. Although quarterly data provide more observations for calculating volatility, they may be subject to larger measurement errors than the annual data. The e¤ect of openness in column 1 is similar to that obtained for equivalent speci…cations based on quarterly data, however, suggesting that possible measurement errors in quarterly data do not drive our results.
The second column of Table 6 measures in ‡ation volatility using quarterly data and 8 year windows (1961 68, 1969 76 and so on) whilst the third column uses 3 year windows (1961 63, 1964 66 and so on). If the 5 year window is too short, in that shocks to in ‡ation are not given time to dissipate, volatility may be understated because a shock with long-lived e¤ects would be recorded as a shift in the mean and limited variation around that mean, not high variation around a stable mean. On the other hand, if shocks dissipate quickly but there are regular shifts in mean in ‡ation, 5 year windows may span these breaks, leading to spurious volatility. The results for alternative window lengths show that the e¤ect of openness is preserved and in each case the relationship is more signi…cant than that obtained using 5 year windows (the puzzling AR(1) outcome in column 2 may re ‡ect low test power in the small sample associated with 8 year windows).
Channels linking openness and in ‡ation volatility
In this section we explore channels through which openness may decrease in ‡ation volatility. The …rst idea that we discussed in section 2 was that openness increases the costs of in ‡ation volatility and therefore provides an incentive for governments to restrict policies that induce volatility in money supply growth and in ‡ation, e.g. recourse to seigniorage during periods of …scal de…cit.
In order to investigate this hypothesis we augment the in ‡ation volatility regressions with a measure of monetary volatility, calculated as the log of one plus the standard deviation of the annual growth rate of money plus quasi-money (V M ON ). 33 If greater monetary stability is one of the channels through which openness lowers in ‡ation volatility then on holding constant V M ON the e¤ect of openness should diminish. The results are based on GMM-SYS estimation in order to deal with potential reverse causation from in ‡ation volatility to monetary volatility and are reported in Table 7 . A constant sample of 344 observations (the largest common sample for these variables) is used throughout. The …rst regression demonstrates that the e¤ect of openness is similar to that estimated previously. Column 2 adds V M ON . The new term is signi…cant at the 5% level while the coe¢ cient multiplying openness is reduced by one third and is insigni…cant at the 10% level. This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that openness induces greater stability in in ‡ation through restricting the volatility of money supply growth.
A second channel through which openness can reduce in ‡ation volatility is promoting structural change in consumption and production, towards high value added goods for which world prices (and hence the terms of trade) are more stable. In column 3 we explore this hypothesis by adding to the baseline regression the term V T OT , de…ned as the log of one plus the standard deviation of the annual growth rate of the export price de ‡ator relative to the import price de ‡ator. 34 The V T OT term is signi…cant and its inclusion reduces the openness coe¢ cient by more than one half, such that it is insigni…cant at the 25% level. This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that openness decreases in ‡ation volatility through inducing greater stability in import prices and export prices, possibly through shifting trade towards high value added goods via the mechanisms discussed in section 2.
In column 4 both V M ON and V T OT are included in the model. Monetary volatility is signi…cant at the 10% level and terms of trade volatility at the 5% level, while the openness coe¢ cient is only a little more than one third its size in column 1. 35 These results suggest that both channels are relevant in explaining the negative impact of openness on in ‡ation volatility.
In columns 5 8 we replicate regressions 1 4 but include domestic output volatility as a further control. If anything, the roles of monetary and terms of trade volatility in accounting for the relationship between openness and in ‡ation volatility are more powerful in this case.
In order to further investigate the monetary volatility and terms of trade volatility channels we present models for the determinants of these two intermediate variables in Table 8 . In column 1 we report a GMM-SYS estimate of a regression in which monetary volatility depends on its own lagged value and openness. Monetary volatility decreases with openness and this …nding survives the inclusion of additional controls in column 2, including the average growth rate of the money supply (M ON ).
A more precise test of the hypothesis that openness reduces monetary and in ‡ation volatility through reducing the propensity for governments to use seigniorage during periods of …scal stress is presented in column 3. The term V SEIGN is the log of one plus the decimal standard deviation of the percentage growth rate of reserve money. This is the narrow measure of the money supply that governments vary in order to raise seigniorage and is frequently used as a basis for measuring seigniorage in empirical work, see for example Aisen and Veiga (2005a) . The volatility of the percentage growth rate of reserve money depends negatively on openness in a parsimonious speci…cation in which the controls are the average growth rate of reserve money (SEIGN ) and the …rst lag of V SEIGN . Furthermore, the e¤ect is signi…cant at the 1% level.
In column 4 the addition of other controls weakens this relationship but it remains signi…cant at the 10% level. Hence, the evidence suggests that trade openness reduces the volatility of reserve money growth, possibly because governments in relatively open economies use seigniorage less frequently in smoothing revenues. This then restricts the volatility of the aggregate money supply, which in turn restricts the volatility of in ‡ation.
We also tried augmenting the baseline in ‡ation volatility regressions with the volatility of reserve money growth, V SEIGN , i.e. an exercise analogous to those performed for V M ON and V T OT and reported in Table 7 . As expected, this reduced the size of the openness coe¢ cient such that it was insigni…cant at the 5% level. However, the V SEIGN term, though positive, was also insigni…cant at conventional levels. This indicates that the link between the volatility of narrow money and the volatility of in ‡ation is less strong than the link between the volatility of broad money growth (V M ON ) and the volatility of in ‡ation. However, we also found that V SEIGN exerts a positive and signi…cant e¤ect on V M ON in GMM-SYS regressions. This suggests that the mechanism through which openness reduces in ‡ation volatility is through …rst decreasing the volatility of reserve money growth. This restricts the volatility of broad money growth, which then restricts the volatility of in ‡ation.
In columns 5 and 6 of Table 8 we present models for the volatility of the growth rate of the terms of trade. The OP EN term is negatively signed and signi…cant even after controlling for the average growth rate of the terms of trade, T OT . A caveat to note is that whilst openness appears to reduce the average size of terms of trade shocks it may cause domestic in ‡ation to be more sensitive to those shocks. The overall e¤ect of openness occurring via the terms of trade channel would then be ambiguous. The fact that the addition of V T OT to the in ‡ation volatility regressions in Table 7 reduced the size of the OP EN coe¢ cient suggests that the role of openness in restricting terms of trade volatility dominates any positive e¤ect arising from increased exposure to shocks.
Overall, whilst the evidence presented here cannot prove that openness reduces in ‡ation volatility through restricting monetary volatility or through changing the structure of consumption and production in favour of goods whose prices are more stable, the results are at least consistent with those hypotheses.
Summary and concluding remarks
In this paper we have examined the evidence linking trade openness and in ‡ation volatility.
The econometric approach used pre-determined variables as instruments in order to identify the exogenous variation in openness. The principal …nding was that countries that have opened up to trade more rapidly than the global average have experienced larger reductions in in ‡ation volatility. The relationship is consistently signi…cant at the 5% level, although in the most general regressions that we consider the quantitative importance of the relationship is quite modest, for instance a one standard deviation increase in openness implies only a 0:13 standard deviation reduction in in ‡ation volatility. However, this is a lower bound on the magnitude of the relationship given that openness may in ‡uence many of the controls that we considered, e.g.
the average rate of in ‡ation and per capita income.
We found that openness reduces in ‡ation volatility amongst …xed exchange rate and ‡ex-ible exchange rate countries, suggesting that our results are unlikely the by-product of open economies choosing …xed exchange rates and …xed rates delivering in ‡ation stability. Sub-sample regressions were used to cast doubt on scenarios in which our results are induced by outliers, poor data quality, the experiences of heavily indebted countries, the adoption of in ‡ation targeting and IMF or World Bank interventions. Finally, we demonstrated that the negative e¤ect of openness on in ‡ation volatility is robust to measuring volatility over di¤erent time intervals.
An important theme of the paper has been the need to pin down channels linking openness and in ‡ation volatility. Two possibilities were emphasised. Firstly, if governments and central banks believe that in ‡ation volatility is especially costly in open economies, e.g. because it undermines the competitiveness of …rms in the tradables sector, they are less likely to resort to seigniorage during periods in which revenues from conventional sources of taxation are temporarily reduced. This will then restrict the volatility of broad money growth and hence in ‡ation. Secondly, openness may change the structure of consumption and production, towards goods whose prices are more stable internationally. This decreases terms of trade volatility and therefore in ‡ation volatility. Our results showed a weaker link between openness and in ‡ation volatility on holding constant monetary and terms of trade volatility, a …nding that is consistent with these two arguments. In combination, the two channels appear to dominate any positive e¤ect of openness on in ‡ation volatility arising from greater exposure to global shocks. The fact that these two channels are likely to be stronger in developing countries than industrial countries provides one explanation for the absence of a clear relationship between openness and in ‡ation volatility amongst OECD countries.
Our …ndings cast interesting new light on the relationship between openness and macroeconomic volatility. In particular, the impact of stronger trading links on nominal forms of macroeconomic volatility such as in ‡ation appears much stronger than its impact on the volatility of real variables such as output growth. An important challenge for future research will be to explore these di¤erences in greater detail and to develop explanations for them based on observable country characteristics.
Appendix A: Countries included in Table 2 The following 12 countries drop out of the sample used in Table 3 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-00 
T A B L E 2 : B A S I C R E S U L T S D E P E N D E N T V A R I A B L E ⎯ Inflation volatility (VINF)
( 
D I A G N O S T I C T E S T S ( P -V A L U E )
I N S T R U M E N T S
VINF(t-2) OPEN (t-2) POP(t-2, t-3) Instruments for level equations : ∆OPEN (t-1) ∆POP(t-2)
Notes:
Estimates are based on a sample of 96 countries, with at least 3 time observations available for each country. Period dummies are included in all specifications (but are not reported) and are also part of the instrument set. Numbers in parentheses are absolute t-statistics based on robust standard errors.
OLS denotes ordinary least squares, WG denotes within groups, GMM denotes 1-step generalised method of moments estimation of the first differenced equation and System denotes 1-step joint generalised method of moments estimation of the first differenced and levels equations.
The Sargan and Difference-Sargan tests of over-identifying restrictions are based on 2-step GMM estimates in order to correct for heteroscedasticity and are asymptotically distributed as χ2(n−p), where n is the number of moment conditions and p is the number of parameters. The serial correlation tests are asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation.
T A B L E 3 : A D D I T I O N A L C O N T R O L S D E P E N D E N T V A R I A B L E ⎯ Inflation volatility (VINF)
(1) See notes to Table 2 . The instruments in column 1 are as in Table 2 except that in the first half of the system OPEN(t-2, t-3) is used. In columns 2-10 the additional instrument is the marginal regressor at t-2, except for the variables INF and GROWTH for which t-3 is used. Also, ∆INF(t-2) is used to instrument the levels equations in columns that control for INF. Column 6 uses ∆VOL(t-2) as an instrument in the second half of the system. Diff-Sargan tests the validity of moment conditions based on the marginal instruments.
D I A G N O S T I C T E S T S ( P -V A L U E )
T A B L E 4 : T H E R O L E O F T H E E X C H A N G E R A T E R E G I M E D E P E N D E N T V A R I A B L E ⎯ Inflation volatility (VINF)
(1) 
I N S T R U M E N T S
VINF(t-2) OPEN (t-2) POP(t-2, t-3) INF(t-3) XRATE(t-2) Instruments for level equations : ∆OPEN (t-1) ∆POP(t-2) ∆INF(t-2) XRATE(t-1)
See notes to Table 2 . Diff-Sargan tests the validity of the moment conditions based on XRATE. Columns (1) and (2) exclude the instruments for INF, since INF is not included in the explanatory variables in those regressions. Column (4) excludes the XRATE instruments because XRATE is not included in the explanatory variables in that regression.
T A B L E 5 : S U B -S A M P L E A N A L Y S I S D E P E N D E N T V A R I A B L E ⎯ Inflation volatility (VINF)
System GMM Estimates 
Instruments VINF(t-2) OPEN (t-2, t-3) POP(t-2, t-3) INF(t-3) Instruments for level equations : ∆OPEN (t-1) ∆POP(t-2) ∆INF (t-2)
See notes to Table 2 . The instrument set varies slightly. Col (2) 
omits OPEN(t-2) and ∆POP (t-2). Col (6) omits OPEN(t-3) and ∆POP (t-2). Col (7) omits OPEN (t-3), POP(t-3) and ∆OPEN (t-1) but includes ∆RGDP (t-1).
T A B L E 6 : V A R Y I N G T H E D A T A F R E Q U E N C Y D E P E N D E N T V A R I A B L E ⎯ Inflation volatility (VINF)
Instruments VINF(t-2) OPEN (t-2, t-3) POP(t-2, t-3) INF(t-3)
Instruments for level equations :
See notes to Table 2 . Column (1) excludes ∆POP (t-2) from the instrument set.
T A B L E 7 : P R O B I N G D E E P E R F O R P O S S I B L E C H A N N E L S D E P E N D E N T V A R I A B L E ⎯ Inflation volatility (VINF)
I N S T R U M E N T S
VINF(t-2 t-4) OPEN(t-2) POP(t-2, t-4) INF(t-3 t-4) VMON(t-2, t-4) VTOT(t-2) VOL(t-2) For level equations : ∆OPEN (t-1) ∆POP(t-2) ∆INF(t-2) ∆VMON (t-1) ∆VTOT(t-1)
See notes to Table 2 . Instruments for mean inflation, monetary volatility, terms of trade volatility and output volatility are used only in equations in which those terms are included in the regressors.
T A B L E 8 : A C L O S E R L O O K A T T H E I N T E R M E D I A T E C H A N N E L S D E P E N D E N T V A R I A B L E ⎯ VMON, VSEIGN, VTOT
I N S T R U M E N T S
VMON(t-2,t-3) VTOT(t-2,t-3) OPEN (t-2,t-3) POP(t-2, t-3) VSEIGN(t-2,t -3) For level equations : ∆OPEN (t-1) ∆POP(t-2) ∆VMON(t-1) ∆VTOT(t-1)
See notes to Table 2 . Columns (2), (4) and (6) use the second lags of each of the extra variables included in those equations as additional instruments for the first differenced equations. Columns (5) and (6) use ∆POP(t-1) rather than
∆POP(t-2).
Special appendix for referees (not part of the paper submitted for publication)
In this special appendix we first consider alternative measures of inflation volatility and openness. In column 1 of Table A1 we estimate the full sample regression using ln(sd(inf)) as the dependent variable, where inf is a number such as 3 (in the main text the dependent variable is ln(1+sd(inf/100)). The sample falls to 530 because the INF term in this regression is ln(mean(inf)), which is undefined in the 8 instances in which mean inflation is negative. The coefficient multiplying openness is much larger than in comparable specifications from the main text due to the change in the units for the dependent variable, but the statistical significance of the estimate is robust.
In column (2) we measure inflation volatility as sd(ln(1+inf/100)). This measure is the volatility of a log rather than the log of a volatility and is intended to address the possibility that the standard deviation is a poor measure of volatility when there are blips in the inflation rate. Applying the log transform before taking the standard deviation down-weights these outliers before they are squared and therefore reduces their effect on the dependent variable. The absolute openness coefficient is quite small, reflecting the down-weighting of extreme observations, but is also more precisely estimated and is significant at the 5% level.
In column (3) the dependent variable is that used in the main text but OPEN is measured as the log import share in GDP. This is the measure of openness used by Romer (1993) . The results are slightly weaker using this measure of openness, suggesting that the size of the export sector is relevant in determining inflation volatility. Nevertheless, the effect is significant at the 5% level.
Results from static regressions
In Table A2 we reproduce the regressions featuring additional controls (columns 3-10 of Table 3 ) except that the lagged dependent variable is excluded on the grounds that it was insignificant in all columns in Table 3 that included mean inflation. The results confirm that the relationship between openness and mean inflation is robust to using static rather than dynamic GMM-SYS models (note that GMM-SYS is an efficient and consistent estimator for static as well as dynamic panel models and has often been used in the static context, see for example Beck 2002) .
Results using additional controls
We now report models incorporating additional controls. As some of the variables are observed only from the mid-1970s, or for a subset of countries, maintaining a constant sample across the columns of Table A3 would mean discarding a large amount of information in some cases and therefore we allow the sample to fluctuate.
Column 1 adds the log ratio of private credit to GDP (PRIVY). This is interpreted as a proxy for financial development, which may reduce volatility through allowing agents to smooth expenditures following income shocks. Financial depth is insignificant while openness is significant at the 10% level but has a smaller coefficient than in Table 2 .
Columns 2 and 3 address the role of financial openness in setting inflation volatility by controlling for the log of one plus gross foreign direct investment as a decimal fraction of GDP (FDI) and the log ratio of private capital flows to GDP (CAPFLOWS) respectively. In both cases the proxies for financial openness are insignificant. This is consistent with the potentially ambiguous effect of financial openness on volatility -recall that Aghion et al (2004) show that foreign investments can be pro-cyclical and therefore amplify volatility, rather than restrict it through compensating for the absence of well functioning domestic credit markets. In contrast, the role of trade openness remains intact.
In column 4 we control for the political constraints index (PCI) derived by Henisz (2000) , which is inversely related to the ability of individual actors to bring about a change in government policy, and in column 5 we control for the log ratio of government spending to GDP (GOV). Political constraints may reduce inflation volatility through restricting discretionary policy interventions (Satyanath and Subramanian (2004) show that political constraints, and broader measures of democracy, reduce nominal macroeconomic volatility). Large governments may stabilise economic activity if state spending less taxation is counter-cyclical, see Fatas and Mihov (2001) for some supporting evidence. In both cases the role of openness in restricting inflation volatility is unaltered, while the additional controls are insignificant. Column 6 controls for the log of one plus an index of climatic volatility (CLIMVOL) defined as the root mean square of monthly precipitation anomalies, and calculated by the Earth Institute at Columbia University. The role of openness is robust to controlling for this measure of climatic shocks.
Finally, columns 7 and 8 control for the log share of agriculture in GDP (AGRI) and the log share of manufacturing in GDP (MANUF). A hypothesis of interest here is that state lead industrialisation programmes may drive expansion in the manufacturing sector and thereby account for reduced inflation volatility in developing countries.
It is important to demonstrate that the role of openness is robust to this effect. On the other hand, it should be noted that we argued that one channel through which openness may reduce inflation volatility is that manufacturing exports increase; as this sector provides a more stable source of income than traditional export industries in developing countries, inflation volatility will fall.
Hence, the estimated effect of openness when holding constant the manufacturing share must reflect channels other than that based on export structures, e.g. a change in the composition of exports or the adoption of more disciplined monetary policy.
The column 8 results show that openness remains significant after controlling for the manufacturing share, indicating that the import structure and monetary stability channels are sufficient to induce a negative relationship between openness and inflation volatility. The MANUF term is negatively signed, supporting the view that expansion in high value added sectors reduces inflation volatility, though its coefficient is poorly estimated.
T A B L E A 1 : A L T E R N A T I V E M E A S U R E S O F O P E N A N D V I N F D E P E N D E N T V A R I A B L E ⎯ Inflation volatility (VINF)
System GMM Estimates (1) 
I N S T R U M E N T S
VINF(t-2) OPEN (t-2, t-3) POP(t-2, t-3) INF(t-3) For level equations : ∆OPEN (t-1) ∆POP(t-2) ∆INF(t-2)
See notes to Table 2 .
T A B L E A 2 : S T A T I C V E R S I O N S O F T H E M O D E L S W I T H A D D I T I O N A L C O N T R O L S D E P E N D E N T V A R I A B L E ⎯ Inflation volatility (VINF)
D I A G N O S T I C T E S T S (p-value)
I N S T R U M E N T S
OPEN (t-2,t-3) POP(t-2,t-3) INF(t-3) For level equations : ∆OPEN(t-1) ∆POP(t-2) ∆INF(t-2)
See notes to Table 2 . Each column uses the second lag of the additional regressor included in that equation as an instrument for the first differenced equation, except in the case of the GROWTH variable for which the third lag is used to ensure the validity of the moment conditions.
T A B L E A 3 : C O N T R O L S N O T C O N S I D E R E D I N T H E M A I N T E X T D E P E N D E N T V A R I A B L E ⎯ Inflation volatility (VINF)
I N S T R U M E N T S
VINF(t-2) OPEN (t-2,t-3) POP(t-2,t-3) INF(t-3) For level equations : ∆OPEN(t-1) ∆POP(t-2) ∆INF(t-2)
See notes to Table 2 . Each column uses the second lag of the additional regressor included in that equation as an instrument for the first differenced equation. Column (1) adds an extra lag of each variable to the instruments used for the first differenced equations and drops ∆POP(t-2) from the instruments for the levels equations. Column (7) uses the fourth lag of agriculture in the instruments because the second lag led to a rejection on the Difference-Sargan test. Column (8) omits ∆POP(t-2) from the instruments.
